Jim Stewart: The effects of "Trumpolicy" on real investment are difficult to understand. Corporate investment and flows of FDI to Ireland and other countries are extensively influenced by factors other than tax, as revealed by annual investment surveys.
Showing posts with label tax policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label tax policy. Show all posts
Thursday, 24 November 2016
Friday, 19 July 2013
A new world order in corporate tax?
The long-awaited OECD Action Plan on Base Erosion and
Profit-Shifting (BEPS) has been released this morning, in time for the G20 meeting
in Moscow. This was promised back in February, and aims to tackled
multinational corporate tax avoidance through a unified approach by the world’s
most powerful economies. For background on the issue of corporate tax avoidance
and why it matters, see my earlier post here, and for a summary of the OECD’s earlier
missive which gives their logic for tackling it, see here.
This topic was top of the agenda at the Lough Erne G20
meeting, and so this report, which sets out what the OECD plan to do and how,
has been eagerly awaited. So what are the highlights? Is it, in fact, a new world order on corporate taxation? Well, before getting into
the detail of the actions, here are five observations on the plan as a whole:
1. Politics: As OECD’s Pascal Saint-Amans said at
the launch, what we have here is not only technical, it is highly political. The
plan now has the support not only of the 34 OECD countries of which Ireland is
one, but also of the entire G20, including the eight countries which are
outside of the OECD (South Africa, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil,
and Saudi Arabia). The combined block represents considerable power, both
economic and political, all of which lends strength to the proposals
2. Timing: All the actions in this plan have short
time-lines for implementation – one to two years, with a few of the deadlines
bleeding out to December 2015. The reason for this is two-fold; the OECD want
to seize the initiative to create something unified here while there is
widespread political consensus on the need to tackle corporate tax avoidance,
and secondly, they want to come up with an international response quickly
before impatient politicians in the individual countries develop their own
independent strategies, which might not be coherent.
3. Absence of scapegoats: Unlike OECD actions in
the 1990s, there is little emphasis on rogue regimes, tax havens or even very
much on tax competition. This is a working document, aimed to provide solutions
by neutralising tax avoidance schemes, rather than naming and shaming countries
4. A top-down, multi-lateral approach: Cleverly,
although the individual taskforces will come up with different recommendations
under the various headings, all of these will be incorporated into a single,
multilateral tax treaty by the end of the process. The (ambitious) aim is that
this will then be adopted by most if not all of the countries involved,
effectively replacing the current network of 3,000+ tax treaties which have
been painstakingly negotiated on a bilateral basis over decades. This network
is used with shocking ease by multinational firms to whisk profit in and out of
various jurisdictions, exploiting minute differences to avoid billions of
taxation, worldwide. If the multilateral treaty is widely adopted, and contains
measures to close down some of the more egregious practices, this will mean a
real change in the environment.
5. Limited innovation: There is a lot here that is
new, but apart from the promised multi-lateral treaty, there is no radical change in the architecture of international tax. Some of what's new is essentially new to the OECD. We will have standards on information
gathering, and moves to spontaneous, automatic exchange of information between
taxing authorities; we will have action on residence, and on mis-match schemes
including the Double Irish. There is country-by-country reporting, but not
publicly. And there is no radical action on how multinational firms are taxed –
no move to a single tax base, for instance; to unitary taxation; no move away from the arms-length as standard for transfer pricing. A large part
of this is almost certainly political – what’s here is perhaps as much as they feel is achievable given
the expanded group of countries they are now addressing with this plan. Not exactly a new world order - no central government, but a serious change nonetheless.
So what is the detail?
The plan contains fifteen separate but interlocking
actions, each of which is assigned a taskforce. Two address the over-arching themes
of the digital economy and the development of the multi-lateral instrument,
while the central thirteen can be loosely arranged under the headings of gaps,
frictions and transparency, OECD-speak for double non-taxation, double-taxation
and secrecy.
Gaps: four taskforces operate under the theme or pillar of
gaps, addressing hybrid mismatches, of which more here, Controlled Foreign
Company (CFC) rules, interest deductibility and harmful tax practices with a
dishonourable mention here for patent box legislation. These taskforces are
looking at coherence, tackling any instruments or rules which are interpreted
in one way by one country, and another by a different one, leaving a little gap
which can be exploited by a multinational firm. A simple example is the use of convertible
shares to finance a subsidiary. In some circumstances, the profit returned to
the parent company can be treated as (tax-deductible) interest when paid by the
subsidiary, but as (tax-free) dividends when received by the parent – an obvious
opportunity to gain a tax advantage while moving profits. However, at the
launch of the report Pascal Saint-Amans specifically referred under this
section to Ireland, the Netherlands, and the US check-the-box rules, so we can
expect this taskforce to also address the now-infamous Double Irish (of which more
here).
Under frictions the OECD is on more familiar ground – they
are aiming to restore the effectiveness of existing standards, and so taskforces
here will look at countering tax treaty abuse (of which more here), and
tightening up the rules on permanent establishments, possibly with an eye on
making it impossible for companies to be entirely stateless. Three taskforces
will look at transfer pricing, specifically examining ways to make the
arms-length standard effective for intangibles, for the transfer of risk and
capital and to address the greyer-than-grey area of management fees and other
such payments. What’s interesting in this cluster is that these actions look to
reinforce and tidy up existing ways of doing business rather than taking a
radical approach, such as unitary taxation or even the type of apportionment of
taxing rights envisaged by the European Commission with the Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB).
Finally, under transparency, four taskforces will look at
the mechanics of gathering data which can be exchanged between taxing
authorities. This is no easy task, and involves issues of data protection, IT
compatibility, a common template for reporting, etc. Companies will be obliged
to report more on their aggressive tax plans, but not publicly, not yet. There
will be more mutual assistance among taxing authorities, and common approaches
to dispute resolution, etc.
When will we see change?
Some of the taskforces will
report in a year, and the new standard is slated for the end of 2015. As every
finance student knows, however, the market anticipates change, and so as soon
as this has been absorbed by the tax planners, we can expect to see a change in
tax plans, and a knock-on impact on how investments are structured and how and
where groups of companies are arranged. Climate change doesn’t happen
overnight, but still it happens, and has real and present impact.
How solid is the support for this?
Pascal
Saint-Amans insists there is extremely solid and widespread support for these measures, even beyond the OECD and G20. He acknowledges that some large firms should end up paying more tax if his plan works, and so some in the business community may be less than thrilled. Interestingly, while they are invited to submit observations, they are not a formal part of any of the taskforces. Nevertheless, he explains that
while some countries or companies will protest publicly, they accede privately, and will support the measures once they are developed. Or as he put it: “the conversation in the room and the conversation in the
corridor are not the same.” It should not take long to see which conversation
carries the most weight.
Sheila Killian
@islandtotheleft
Wednesday, 5 June 2013
International tax avoidance - an update
In advance of the G8, it might be useful to update what’s
happening with the main international movers on the question of international
tax avoidance. For a primer in this, see this earlier post.
The OECD at the end of last month formally reaffirmed their
commitment to address tax base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS - of which more here). Again, their
motivation is mainly economic, arising from the damage done to tax revenue and the
integrity of the system by tax avoidance, and the impact this might have on
growth and employment. This time they specifically mention the damage done to
emerging and developing economies also, which marks a move by the OECD to be
more inclusive on this process. The next BEPS report is now due in July, and
this will set out a timeline for the full project. At this stage, it’s
anticipated that concrete changes will be coming in perhaps two and a half
years. In the meantime, there is a
commitment on the part of OECD ministers, including our own, to collaborate
more; to work on transfer pricing rules with a specific focus on intangibles;
to consider revising treaties to take account of digital goods and services and
to address arbitrage. The idea of a multi-lateral tax treaty to replace the
many bilateral treaties is still on the table.
The OECD is not, of course, as inclusive a body as the UN,
and in fact the UN has observer status at OECD meetings on tax. The UN itself
is starting work on the taxation of mining, oil and gas companies, with a particular
focus on how this impacts development in the global south. They have also
officially launched their Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries,
and continue to work on capacity-building for taxing authorities in
less-developed economies. They do serious work, and are also seriously under-funded.
The EU continue to work on their action plan published last
December, the main recommendations of which include blacklisting non-compliant
jurisdictions, and including a clause on double non-taxation in new
treaties. They also work with the UN on supporting capacity-building for the
Global South. The EU specifically note that aggressive tax avoidance
contravenes the principles of corporate social responsibility, which is
interesting in the context of recent comments by, for example, Apple’s Steve
Wozniak on the ethics of tax avoidance.
Meanwhile, David Cameron has summoned the leaders of Britain’s
overseas territories, asking them to sign up to information-sharing. This is an
effort to address so-called “secrecy havens” such as Jersey and the British
Virgin Islands, which not only form a key part of the global tax avoidance
chain, but are also potentially used in money-laundering more broadly. None of
this addresses domestic UK tax rules. Cameron has said he
aims to make tax transparency a key theme of the G8 summit.
These are interesting times. Some very senior tax planners of global
multinationals spoke to me last week of their reaction to the outrage
about Apple’s tax affairs. They could see that very aggressive tax planning was
becoming unacceptable, but having built successful careers in the practice, were
mostly taken unawares at the force of change. As one put it: “Suddenly all this is
supposed to be wrong?” The wind of regulation is shifting. Both
multinational companies and countries which seek their international investment need to work hard to keep up.
Sheila Killian
@islandtotheleft
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